Consequences of Political Instability, Governance and
      Bureaucratic Corruption on Inflation and Growth: The Case of
      Pakistan. by Haider, Adnan et al.
©The Pakistan Development Review 
50:4 Part II (Winter 2011) pp. 773–807 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequences of Political Instability, Governance and 
Bureaucratic Corruption on Inflation and Growth:  
The Case of Pakistan 
 
ADNAN HAIDER, MUSLEH UD DIN and EJAZ GHANI
*
 
 
“Countries that have pursued distortionary macroeconomic policies, 
including high inflation, large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates, 
appear to have suffered more macroeconomic volatility and also grown more 
slowly during the postwar period. Does this reflect the causal effect of these 
macroeconomic policies on economic outcomes? One reason to suspect that the 
answer may be no is that countries pursuing poor macroeconomic policies also 
have weak ‘‘institutions,’’ including political institutions that do not constrain 
politicians and political elites, ineffective enforcement of property rights for 
investors, widespread corruption, and a high degree of political instability.” 
Acemoglu, et al. (2003) 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Political regimes in Pakistan have strongly influenced the economic outcomes. 
Whereas the autocratic regimes have tended to exhibit good economic performance with 
low and stable inflation, robust growth, and fiscal discipline helped by relatively high 
revenue generation and checks on public expenditure, the democratic regimes have been 
marked by macroeconomic instability and sluggish economic growth. In addition, 
autocratic regimes also witnessed relatively stable external sector along with low trade 
deficit and high capital inflows in the form of foreign direct investments and portfolio 
investments, which indicates high level of confidence of foreign investors in the domestic 
economy. On the other hand, key economic indicators have generally deteriorated during 
different episodes of democratic regimes.
1
 Table 1 summarises the relative performance 
of selected macroeconomic variables across different political regimes.   
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For comprehensive comparison of both regimes, see Iqbal, et al. (2008) and Zaidi (2006).  
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Table 1 
 Performance of Selected Macroeconomic Indicators across Political Regimes 
Regime* RGDPgr TFPgr PINVgr BBR ER INF UR M2gr Corrp Gov 
1 3.18 2.10 22.14 –5.41 3.41 3.54 0.15 8.30 1.83 3.12 
2 2.74 0.09 2.73 –9.11 4.55 4.38 0.10 10.41 3.13 3.75 
3 5.69 1.19 7.45 –11.04 4.76 2.71 0.84 10.80 3.50 6.05 
4 5.35 1.28 6.19 –9.24 4.76 3.80 1.85 9.42 3.00 6.50 
5 3.67 –0.98 –2.46 –6.88 7.81 6.70 1.94 10.04 1.67 6.53 
6 4.87 0.62 8.49 –9.44 9.90 16.69 2.32 18.87 1.50 3.73 
7 6.45 1.67 4.94 –8.59 13.67 7.27 3.70 15.62 2.05 3.83 
8 5.12 0.40 4.81 –9.57 22.87 9.30 4.37 16.48 2.00 6.11 
9 2.44 –2.81 3.84 –9.09 28.11 9.83 4.70 17.77 2.00 5.25 
10 4.69 –0.20 1.27 –7.01 34.85 11.72 5.43 15.35 2.23 2.06 
11 2.17 –1.78 –0.33 –7.64 43.08 9.81 6.00 13.37 2.96 1.04 
12 3.48 –0.02 0.84 –6.29 52.53 5.39 6.85 9.75 2.35 1.04 
13 5.45 1.71 7.05 –4.52 60.02 6.57 7.06 16.35 2.67 4.40 
14 3.68 1.90 7.28 –7.83 62.63 12.00 5.20 15.35 2.00 3.50 
15 2.62 –0.77 –8.92 –5.47 82.68 15.43 5.78 12.63 1.00 1.40 
Source: Author’s calculations. For data sources and description of variables, please refer Section 3. 
Variable List: RGDPgr = Average growth of real gross domestic product; TFPgr = Average growth of total 
factor productivity; PINVgr=Average growth of real private investment; BBR = Average of Budget Balance 
ratio to GDP (in percent); ER = Average Exchange rate; INF = Average inflation rate (in percent); UR = 
Average Unemployment rate; M2gr = Average growth in broad money (M2); Corrp = Aveage level of 
Corruption and Gov = Average Level of Governance.   
* For political regime categorisation, please refer to Table A4 in Appendix. Further, shaded rows represent 
autocratic regimes. 
 
 The economy grew more than 5 percent per annum on average during autocratic 
regimes, which is 1.5 percentage points higher than the average growth rate observed 
during democratic regimes. Similarly, in all autocratic regimes, average economic growth 
remained above 5 percent with the exception of the second regime in which average 
economic growth was 2.74 percent. However, in the case of all democratic regimes 
average annual growth remained in the range from 2 percent to 5 percent. Therefore, 
more than 5 percent average annual growth across all autocratic regimes signifies the 
relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals during these regimes. Similarly, growth in 
total factor productivity (TFP) during autocratic regimes outstripped the same in 
democratic eras: average annual growth of TFP during autocratic regimes was 1.19 
percent as compared with TFP growth of –0.15 percent during the democratic regimes. A 
look at other macroeconomic indicators also shows that the economic performance 
during the autocratic regimes has been much better than that observed during the 
democratic regimes. For example, real private investment is a leading indicator of 
confidence the general public has in the government and its policies. Growth 
performance of real investment in autocratic eras has been far better than in the 
democratic regimes. Average growth in real investment in autocratic regimes was 5.67 
percent per annum as compared with 3.70 percent during the democratic regimes.  
Autocratic regimes have also outperformed the democratic regimes in terms of 
fiscal discipline and price stability. Consider, for example, the budget balance ratio which 
is the ratio of fiscal balance to GDP; the higher the ratio in absolute terms the worse is the 
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fiscal position. Barring short periods where democratic regimes have a slight edge over 
autocratic regimes, the former have mostly outperformed the latter in terms of fiscal 
discipline: average budge balance ratio in autocratic regimes is –8.1 percent whereas in 
democratic regimes the same is –7.9 percent. In terms of price stability, the democratic 
regimes have often been marked by high levels of inflation: average inflation in 
autocratic regimes stood at 4.9 percent per annum as compared with 10 percent for 
democratic regimes.  
What factors could explain the differences in economic performance during 
autocratic and democratic regimes? A growing and influential body of empirical research 
has sought to identify the causes of poor economic outcomes as reflected in high inflation 
and low economic growth. There is a near consensus in the literature that poor economic 
outcomes are often associated with lack of good governance and poor state institutions 
which promote rent seeking and corruption thus impeding the process of economic 
growth.
2
  
In the case of Pakistan, few studies have examined the role of governance and 
institutions in macroeconomic outcomes. For example, Khawaja and Khan (2009), 
Hussain (2008) and Qayyum, et al. (2008) note that good governance and better 
institutional quality are necessary conditions for batter economic outcomes. Siddique and 
Ahmed (2010a, 2010b) investigate the long run positive relationship between institutional 
quality and economic growth. They find unidirectional causality running from 
institutional quality to economic growth. Another recent study by Zakria and Fida (2011) 
finds indirect effects of democracy on economic growth. Similarly, Qureshi, et al. (2010) 
and Khan and Saqib (2011) find positive and significant impact of political instability 
(where political instability is defined as frequent cabinet changes and government in 
crises) on inflation in Pakistan.  
The above studies are mostly empirical in nature and lack theoretical foundations 
without which it is difficult to explain how governance, democracy, political instability, 
quality of institutions and other deeper determinants impact inflation and growth. This 
study fills the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model with micro-
foundations that captures some of the highlighted features of Pakistan's economy. 
Furthermore, using actual data, computational modeling is done by applying Markov-
Regime switching technique with maximum-likelihood procedures. The estimation 
results based on empirical modeling setup are in line with the stylised-facts and also 
confirm the intuitive implications of the theoretical model.   
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature that 
explores the links between corruption, quality of governance, inflation and economic growth. 
Section 3 presents theoretical model. Section 4 describes data and empirical methodology. 
Main findings are discussed in Section 5 and the concluding remarks are stated in Section 6. 
 
2.  HOW CORRUPTION AND GOVERNANCE LEAD TO INFLATION  
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH? 
Cross country studies provide many plausible explanations of persistence of high 
inflation with low economic growth. In general, high inflation might be associated with 
 
2
 See for instance, Baumol (1990), Murphy, et al. (1991), Acemoglu (1995), Mauro (1995) and Baumol 
(2004). 
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market imperfections, exchange rates fluctuations, cost-push factors such as food supply 
shortages, energy inflation in the case of oil importing countries and conventional 
demand pull factors including private consumption and government expenditures. But 
research brings a common synthesis that in the long run inflation can persist only when 
there is excessive money supply growth [see for instance, McCandless and Weber 
(1995); David and Kanago (1998) and Fischer, et al. (2002)]. Several empirical studies 
on inflation-growth nexus have found that high and persistent inflation is harmful to 
economic growth whereas low and stable inflation is considered as conducive for the 
process of economic growth. For example, Khan and Senhadji (2001) estimate the 
threshold levels of inflation both for advance and emerging economies. They find that up 
to these threshold levels growth is positively related with inflation and beyond these 
levels, inflation exerts a negative effect on economic growth. In particular, the threshold 
estimates are 1-3 percent and 7-11 percent for industrial and developing countries, 
respectively. Figure 1 shows the relationship between CPI inflation and real GDP growth 
and between CPI inflation and M2 growth for OECD
3
 (organisation for economic 
corporation and development) and developing countries
4
 for the sample 1984 to 2010.  
 
Fig. 1: Relationships of CPI Inflation with Economic Growth and  
                            Broad Money Growth 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on International Financial Statistics of IMF Database. 
 
3
List of OECD countries: Australia, Austria , Belgium , Canada , Denmark, Finland, France,  Greece , 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States. 
4List of Developing Countries: Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
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This figure shows positive relationship between CPI inflation and M2 growth for 
both panels of countries. For developing countries this relationship is much stronger as 
compared with OECD case. Similarly, it shows negative relationship between CPI 
inflation and Real GDP growth for both the panels. In developing countries inflation 
normally persists at high levels so the negative relationship in this case is much stronger 
as compared with OECD countries where inflation remains below its threshold level. 
These observations confirm that high inflation is harmful for economic growth especially 
for emerging countries and it is mainly determined by high growth in money supply. 
Apart from monetarist interpretations of high inflation coupled with low economic 
growth, recent research provides better explanations of the causes of high money growth 
and hence inflation. Rahmani and Yousefi (2009) classify these explanations into three 
broad categories: (a) political business cycle theories of inflation determination; (b) time 
inconsistency theory of optimal planning; and (c) seigniorage explanations of high rate of 
money growth and inflation. 
The literature on political business cycle (PBC) theories provides two main 
explanations for sustained inflation: political instability with deficit bias hypothesis and 
war of iteration philosophy. The seminal attempts by Nordhaus (1975) and Alesina and 
Tabellini (1990) relate political instability to deficit bias as a possible determinant of 
inflation both in the long and short run spans. Nordhaus (1975) argues that with 
expectations augmented Phillips curve (EAPC) where expectations are assumed to be 
adaptive, there could be a likelihood of higher than social optimal inflation rate in the 
long-run. Alesina (1987), Alesina (1989), Rogoff and Sibert (1988) consider rational 
expectations approach as opposed to adaptive expectation schemes and come up with 
similar results. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) invoke deficit bias hypothesis and explain 
that alternating governments are either uncertain of each others’ preferences or they 
disagree over the composition of public spending that gives rise to excessively high 
budget deficits. This deficit bias thus yields suboptimal outcomes which put pressure on 
inflation in both short and long run. Thus in this case inflation is a result of opportunistic 
behavior by alternative governments that are in office and try to influence myopic voters 
for reelection.  
Alesina and Drazen (1991) expound the war of attrition philosophy which is the 
extension of Hibbs’ (1977) findings. These studies focus on the cyclical behaviour of the 
economy and consider inflation as the result of ideological differences of political parties 
that come to power alternately within a setting of asymmetric information among key 
political parties. The higher the number of political parties in a legislative council, the 
higher the likelihood of conflict, the harder it is to reach agreements and the higher the 
increase in fiscal which ultimately leads to high inflation. 
The second line of research attempts to explain the reasons of high inflation rates 
within an optimal planning framework with time inconsistency problems. These 
problems occur as a result of the game between policy making authorities and the private 
sector agents. The seminal attempts in this direction are Kydland and Prescott (1977), 
Barro and Gordon (1983a), Barro and Gordon (1983b), Backus and Driffill (1985) and 
Rogoff (1985). These studies explain the high money supply growth and inflation rates 
by using game theoretic approaches. The main argument is that the policy makers in 
certain cases take advantage of discretionary powers with the assumption of asymmetric 
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information while preparing policies to reduce unemployment or to increase economic 
growth at the cost of higher inflation. Private agents on the other hand are rational and 
aware of these hidden incentives. They do not trust policy rules unless some kind of strict 
commitments exist. Therefore, credibility plays a major role in such cases. This body of 
research also proposes reputation and delegation as possible solutions to lower money 
growth and inflation rates. 
The third line of research for explaining high inflation rate is seigniorage. Khan 
and Saqib (2011) and Carlstom and Fuerst (2000) consider a weak form of fiscal theory 
of price level (weak-form FTPL) determination. According to the theory of optimal 
taxation,
5
 the government tries to equate the marginal cost of inflation tax with the 
marginal cost of output taxes in order to minimise the distortions of taxation. Therefore, 
the government may choose to use seigniorage as a way to finance public expenditures 
and budget deficit. Recent studies including Telartar, et al. (2010), Aisen and Veiga 
(2008), Aisen and Veiga (2006), Cukeirman, et al. (1992) and Paldem (1987) also 
provide similar arguments that economies with political instability and weak institutions 
lack an efficient tax system, which results in reliance on seigniorage. To meet the demand 
for public expenditures governments print more money which eventually leads to higher 
inflation. 
It is generally accepted that these three explanations for high money growth and 
high inflation can help in understanding the situation in developing countries. However, 
there could be some other plausible reasons due to the existence of bad governance, poor 
quality of institutions and high level of corruption activities in developing countries 
which can cause high inflation rates along with low economic growth. Figure 2 shows the 
relationship between governance and corruption with CPI inflation and real GDP growth 
for sixty OECD and developing countries.  
This figure shows that less corruption and good governance is negatively related 
with average CPI inflation and positively related with real GDP growth. There are a 
number of reasons that can explain these stylised facts: (a) corruption may cause a 
misallocation of talent and skills away from productive (entrepreneurial) activities 
[Acemoglu (1995) and Murphy, et al., (1991)]; (b) corruption may undermine the 
protection of the property rights, create obstacles to doing business and impede 
innovation and technological transfer [Hall and Jones (1999) and North (1990)]; (d) 
corruption may cause firms to expand less rapidly, to adopt inefficient technologies and 
to shift their operations to the informal sector [Svensson (2005)]; (e) corruption may limit 
the extent of a country’s trade openness and reduce inflows of foreign investment 
[Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) and Wei (2000)]; (f) corruption may lead to costly 
concealment and detection of illegal income, resulting in a deadweight loss of resources 
[Blackburn, et al. (2006) and Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio (2007)]; (g) corruption may 
compromise human development through a deterioration in the scale and quality of 
public health and education programs [Blackburn and Sarmah (2008), Gupta, et al. 
(2000) and Reinikka and Svensson (2005)]; and (h) corruption may cause a general 
misallocation of public expenditures as certain areas of spending are targeted more for 
their capacity to generate bribes than their potential to improve living standards [Gupta, 
et al. (2001), Mauro (1995) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)]. 
 
5 See, for instance, Phelps (1973), Vegh (1989) and Aizenman (1992). 
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Fig. 2. Relationships of CPI Inflation and Economic Growth with Corruption  
                 and Governance 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on International Financial Statistics of IMF Database and International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database. 
 
In terms of public finances, corruption and poor governance may independently 
impact both the expenditure and revenue sides of the government’s budget: for any given 
state of the latter, corruption can distort the composition of expenditures in ways 
described above; for any given state of the former, corruption can alter the manner by 
which revenues must be generated, as suggested by other empirical evidence. Thus Ghura 
(1998), Imam and Jacobs (2007) and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997, 2000) conclude that 
corruption reduces total tax revenues by reducing the revenues from almost all taxable 
sources. The implication is that, ceteris paribus, other means of raising income must be 
sought, and one of the most tempting of these is seigniorage. Significantly, it has been 
found that inflation is positively related to the incidence of corruption, see for instance, 
Al-Marhubi (2000) and Rahmani and Yousefi (2009). These studies also noted that 
corruption causes inflation to increase directly by increasing government expenditures 
and therefore budget deficit that is financed by seigniorage. However, there is an indirect 
channel through which corruption increase the inflation rate. Since the growth rate of 
GDP is lower when corruption is higher and since the inflationary effect of the growth in 
the money supply is higher when the growth rate of GDP is lower, the higher the inflation 
rate the higher is corruption. 
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3.  DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
This section provides a detailed description of the theoretical model explicitly 
outlining its micro-foundations.
6
 The model economy consists of private households, 
public officials, firms and government as representative agents. Every agent tries to 
optimise its objective function subject to its constraints. The model links corruption 
motives of public officials and governance behaviour of government with different 
political regimes. These links have implications for the role of corruption and 
governance on inflation and growth which are discussed in the results section of the 
paper.    
   
3.1.  Agent’s Preferences 
The theoretical model considers an economy inhabited by a continuum of infinite-
lived agents, who derive their lifetime utility based on consumption of private goods, Ct, 
consumption of public goods and services, St,  and leisure, (1–Lt). The agents-population 
is normalised to one and divided into a fraction,   (0,1) of private agents (or assumed 
to be standard households), who provide labour to firms and the remaining fraction, (1–
)  (0,1) as bureaucrats, who work for the government as public officials. Labour 
supply decision of each agent follows standard Walrasian features. 
At time t, the intertemporal utility function of the representative agent is specified 
as: 
 



0
)1(,,
t
tttt
t
t LSCUU   … … … … … (3.1) 
Where,  (0,1) is a discount factor. It is assumed that utility function is separable in 
each of its argument and its specification is given as: 
 




1
)1(
)log()log()1(,,
1
t
tttttt
L
SCLSCU   … … … (3.2) 
Where, v is elasticity of labour supply and  > 1 is weight associated with consumption of 
public good in the agents welfare function. Utility function (3.2) also follows standard 
assumption about increasing with diminishing return in each of its argument, i.e., 
0)(  tU  and 0)(
22  tU . 
Each agent maximises his/her lifetime utility function (3.1) subject to the 
following intertemporal (flow) budget constraint:  
tt
t
t
ttt
t
t
tt AR
P
M
LWA
P
M
SC )1(11 

  … … … (3.3) 
and a sequence of cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint: 
 tttt
t
t AASC
P
M
 

1
1  … … … … … (3.4) 
 
6This model is an extension of Blackburn and Powell (2011) and Del Monte and Papagni (2001). 
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Where, Mt denotes nominal money holdings at time t, At denotes real asset holdings at 
time t, Pt denotes the general price level and Rt is the real returns on assets. The 
optimisation process solves the following problem as:  
 
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(3.5) 
Where, 1t and 1t are Lagrange-multipliers associated with the flow budget constraint 
(3.3) and CIA constraint (3.4) respectively. The solution to the above optimisation 
problem (3.5) yields the following first order conditions (FOC’s): 



0
tC
        tt
tC
21
1
  … … … … … (3.6) 



0
tS
        tt
tS
21 

 … … … … … (3.7) 



0
tL
        ttt WL 1)1( 
  … … … … … (3.8) 




0
1tA
      1211121 )1(   ttttt R  … … … (3.9) 



0
tM
       121111)1(   tttt  … … … (3.10) 
Where, 
t
tt
t
P
PP 
 
1
1  
 
3.2.  Firm’s Behaviour 
Each firm hires labour from private households, Lt and produces output, Yt with 
capital, Kt index of technological innovation,
7
 Zt 
and governance, Gt. The production 
function specification is Cobb-Douglas which is in line with the endogenous growth 
literature.
8
  
  1)( ttttt KLGZY      )1,0( ,    1  … … … (3.11) 
Where,  > 0. Following, Barro (1990), Huang and Wie (2006) and Choudhary, et al. 
(2010), governance, Gt can be defined as: 
ttG          10   … … … … … … (3.12) 
 
7It captures positive externality effect associated with learning-by-doing process as similar with 
endogenous growth literature. See for example: Jones (1995) and Romer  (1986). 
8 For seminal work, please refer: Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
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Where, t is a lump-sum tax paid to government on behalf of the governance and  
denotes the parameter of governance efficiency scale. If it is less then unity then it 
implies that government is unable to translate tax revenue into effective governance.
 9
  
Due to long-run considerations, prices are assumed to be completely flexible and 
there is no fixed cost. The total variable cost of each firm consists of wages, WtLt, lump-
sum tax cost , t and rate of return on capital, RtKt. Firm’s profit maximisation problem 
implies: 
ttttttttt KRLWKLGZ 
 1)(  … … … (3.13) 
From (3.12), we have, 
ttttttttt
GKL
GKRLWKLGZ
ttt 
 
1
)(max 1
,,
 
FOC’s are: 



0
tL
        
t
t
t W
L
Y
  … … … … … (3.14) 



0
tK
       
t
t
t R
K
Y
 )1(  … … … … … (3.15) 



0
tG
        


1
t
t
G
Y
 … … … … … (3.16) 
These FOC’s simply state that on optimum marginal products are equal to their 
respective prices. Further due to the consideration of Walrasian features, there is no 
markup associated with any price. 
 
3.3.  Behaviour of Bureaucratic Corruption across Political Regimes 
In order to model bureaucratic corruption, it is assumed that a fraction, (0,1), of 
public officials is involved in corruption by embezzling public funds. This creates a 
leakage in the government revenues which puts pressures on government to make less 
expenditure on public infrastructure. This can be observed by simply linking corruption 
with governance efficiency scale. Following, Svensson (1995) we assume that  is 
inversely linked with . Therefore, (3.16) can be written as: 



1
t
t
G
Y
 
… … … … … … … (3.17) 
This implies that an increase in the level of bureaucratic corruption leads toward 
less-effective governance. So in this way government can directly affect a firm’s net-
worth, an assumption consistent with Choudhary, et al. (2010). However, outcome of this 
 
9
Following, Choudhary, et al. (2010), Hall and Jones (1999) and North (1990), good governance is 
defined in terms of institutional credibility, effective laws/regulations and infrastructure stability which favours 
production process. 
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type of bureaucratic corruption is uncertain because of the changing nature of political 
regimes. An autocratic regime, where government aims at good governance, bears a 
monitoring cost in order to reduce the level of corruption. Following, Del Monte and 
Papagni (2001), it is assumed that on optimal government imposes a penalty of getting 
caught, which is exactly equal to the monetary value of monitoring cost. While 
maintaining the assumption of risk neutrality, the bureaucrat maximises expected profits 
as: 
tttBE  )1()(  … … … … … (3.18) 
Where,  is the probability of getting caught which is defined as:  = (1/2)2. This 
implies that as corruption rises, probability of getting caught also rises with the penalty 
rate . The Optimisation problem yields the following solution: 
  0)2/1()( 2 





tt
BE  
  01 t  


1
 … … … … … … … (3.19) 
Hence, as penalty rate rises bureaucratic corruption reduces. Using (3.19) it is easy to 
define political regimes as politically stable and politically instable as: 
 
  (a) 0lim 
    
   1
   
: Politically Sable Regime 
 
  (b) 
 0
lim
   
   0
  
: Politically Instable Regime 
 
In politically stable regime, as penalty rate rises, bureaucratic corruption reduces. This 
reduction causes increase in governance efficiency scale. It promotes favorable conditions for 
firms to produce more and on aggregate, the economy wide output increases.   
 
3.4.  Government 
In our model economy, the government performs the following tasks. It receives 
tax revenues from firms in exchange of the governance it provides. Among these tax 
revenues, it makes expenditures on public infrastructure at the rate, (0,1) and also pays 
salaries to public officials, (1–)WtLt. Since a fraction of public officials is involved in 
corruption there is a possible leakage of the available tax revenue which otherwise can be 
available for expenditures. Hence, corruption causes deficit in the government fiscal 
balance. This deficit is finance by monetary seigniorage, (Ht – Ht–1) 
which ultimately 
causes inflation in the economy. Thus, the government budget constraint is the following: 
tttt
t
t LW
P
H
m
m







)1()1(
1
 … … … … (3.20) 
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Where, ((1–)t  is the remaining amount of public funds after corruption and m  is the 
rate of growth in monetary base defined as: 
1
1


t
tt
H
HH
m . Therefore, in this way on 
aggregate both weak governance and corruption are positively associated with high 
inflationary due to high dependency on monetary seigniorage and, reduce output by 
effecting firm’s net-worth via (3.17) and (3.19) channels. 
Hence, as (3.17), (3.19) and (3.20) confirm that as stable political regime comes 
into power, governance increases and bureaucratic corruption reduces thus increasing 
output and slowing down the inflationary process. Unstable political regime reverses the 
whole scenario. Therefore, both governance and corruption have different implications on 
inflation and growth in different political regimes. 
 
3.5.  Solution of the Theoretical Model 
Due to long run considerations, we will restrict our model solution to the balance 
growth equilibrium of the model. For simplicity, it is assumed that the steady state 
growth rate of all real variables is . For solution, we need to collect all equilibrium 
conditions of the model with the assumptions that capital and money markets are clear in 
the long run, i.e. At = Kt  and Mt = Ht. The equilibrium conditions, therefore, are: 
(a) tt
tC
21
1
  
(b) tt
tS
21 

 
(c) ttt WL 1)1( 
   
(d)  1211121 )1(   ttttt R   
(e)  121111)1(   tttt    
t
t
t
P
P 1
11

   
(f) tttt
t
t AASC
P
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 

1
1  
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t
t
ttt
t
t
tt AR
P
M
LWA
P
M
SC )1(11 

  
(h) ttG 


1
 
(i) t
t
t W
L
Y
   
(j) t
t
t R
K
Y
 )1(  
(k) 
t
t
G
Y
    
(l) tttt
t
t LW
P
H
m
m







)1()1(
1
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In the balanced-growth path Ct 
grows at a constant rate )1(  . So )( 21 tt   
grows at 
1)1(  . Thus condition (e) implies: 111211 ))(1(   ttt r . 
Substituting it in (f) implies: 
)()1)(1( 11211111   ttt  
By virtue of the binding CIA constraint (g), inflation is constant and inversely 
related to growth according to: 



1
1
1 m
 … … … … … … … (3.21) 
(f) and (g) also yield the following result: 



1
)1)(1(
2R
 … … … … … … (3.22) 
In aggregate xt comprises the income of all agents as: 









t
t
ttttttt
L
WLWLWLx
)1(
)1()1)(1(  
After simplification and substituting equilibrium conditions we have: 
tt
t
t YY
Y
x 











 
… … … … … (3.23) 
CIA and agents budget constraint simultaneously simplifies with equilibrium 
conditions as: 
tt
t
t RKx
P
H
  
Therefore, 
ttt
t
t YYY
P
H
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




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

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







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Substituting it in (m) we get: 
ttttt LWY
m
m
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

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
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After simplification we get: 
 
 
 
 





 )1()1(
)1()1()1()1(
1 m
m
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 
 


 )1()1(
)1()1(
1 m
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 



)1(
)1()1(
m  
Hence, 
 



)1(
)1()1(
m  … … … … (3.24) 
Hence, (3.19), (3.21) and (3.24) show that in the presence of corruption, an 
increase in governance inefficiency leads to inflationary pressure along with low 
economic growth.   
 
4.  DESCRIPTION OF EMPIRICAL MODELS 
This section briefly outlines the empirical setup by illustrating data, specification 
of econometric models and regime switching estimation methodology used in this paper. 
 
4.1.  Data 
To estimate the model parameters, data over the annual frequencies from 1950 to 
2011 on fourteen macroeconomic/political variables are used: the inflation rate based on 
consumer price index (CPI); real gross domestic product (Real GDP); per capita output; 
trade shares in terms of GDP as a proxy of openness; agriculture output shares in terms of 
GDP; nominal exchange rate of Pak-Rupees in terms of US dollars; government 
borrowing; fiscal balance ratio as percent of GDP;  private sector credit; international oil 
prices; avg. year of schooling as proxy of human capital; central bank governor turnover; 
index of corruption and index of governance. Details on the construction and the sources 
of the data set are provided in table A1 of Appendix-A. Descriptive statistics and pair-
wise correlation matrix of above mentioned variables are also reported in Table A2 and 
table A3 of Appendix-A. These correlations are consistent with the standard theory. The 
results based on descriptive statistics show that average levels of corruption and 
governance for the complete sample are 2.24 and 6.21 respectively. The low values of 
corruption and governance indices indicate high levels of corruption along with poor 
governance. The average inflation and economic growth for the complete sample are 7.5 
and 5.0 respectively. The correlation coefficients of corruption with inflation and growth 
are –0.48 and 0.11. These negative values show positive relationship of corruption with 
inflation and positive correlation values of corruption with growth shows negative 
relationship. Similarly, pair-wise correlation values show negative relationship of 
governance with inflation and positive relationship of governance with growth.  
 
4.2.  Specification of the Econometric Models 
Following standard practices, we specify two econometric models, one for the 
explanation of inflation and second for economic growth. The approach followed here is 
to add corruption and governance in both the models as explanatory variables along with 
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the standard determinants of inflation and economic growth. In order to examine the 
interactions of governance and corruption with inflation and growth across different 
political regimes, we find it useful to estimate econometric models with Markov-Regime 
switching approach. This approach enables us to examine the varying nature of deeper 
determinants across different regimes. The specification of growth model is consistent 
with Barro (1991), Hall and Jones (1999), Ahmed and Danish (2010a, 2010b) and 
Zakaria and Fida (2011); whereas the specification of the econometric model for inflation 
is consistent with Al-Marhubi (2000), Rahmani and Yousefi (2009), Khan and Saqib 
(2011). These specifications are given as: 
ttsttstttt
ttttttt
govcorrupTurnoverCBGovernerOilpPvtCredit
FBRingGovtBorrowExRateAgriOutputopennpcy
inf,,2,1987
6543210inf


and 
tytsttsttt
ttttttt
govcorrupHCOilp
PvtCreditFBRingGovtBorrowAgriOutputopenny
,,2,187
6543210 inf


 
Where; inf:= CPI inflation rate; y:=real GDP growth; pcy:=per capita output growth; 
openn:= trade shares as percent of GDP; ExRate:=nominal exchange rate; 
GovtBorrowing:= net budgetary borrowing as percent of GDP; FBR:= fiscal balance 
ratio as percent of GDP; PvtCredit:= growth in private sector credit; Oilp:= 
international oil prices; CBGovernerTurnover:= Central Bank Governer Turnover; 
HC:=Human capital; corrupt:= index of corruption; gov:= index of governance and 
’s:= residual terms.   
Here, s' and s'  are fixed coefficients and s'  and s'  are regime switching 
coefficients. St represents the state at time t with switching to take place between 
autocratic and democratic regimes. We also allow the variance of the error terms to 
switch simultaneously between the states.  
 
4.3.  Markov Regime Switching Approach 
The Markov Regime Switching (hence after, MRS) modeling approach was 
originally introduced by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) in the field of econometrics. 
Cosslett and Lee (1985) have extended this approach by providing iterative 
algorithms to compute likelihood functions. This seminal attempt was similar in 
spirit of the state-space modeling using Kalman filter approach. Later, this approach 
has been used extensively in various economic applications, including Hamilton 
(1989), in the case of business cycle modeling and Engel and Hamilton (1990) for 
exchange rate analysis. To validate the outcomes of this approach various statistical 
tests have been developed. Some of the tests based on moment conditions and 
stationarity diagnostics can be found in Tjøstheim (1986), Yang (2000) and Francq 
and Zakoïan (2001). A comprehensive textbook treatment of this approach can be 
found in Hamilton (1994). 
In our case, this approach allows us to estimate how much bureaucratic corruption 
and governance quantitatively impacts inflation and economic growth across different 
political regimes. Some of the technical details are given below. 
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Let us assume a time series, t , (let it denotes inflation rate) with its conditional 
density function: );|( 1  ttf  where; 1t  is the information set which contains past 
values and other explanatory variables and   is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
The simplest two-state case in which the structural changes occur at the particular time, 
1tt  , its density function changes to );,1|( 1  ttf  for 1t  observations and 
);,2|( 1  ttf  for other 1ttn   observations. The corresponding likelihood functions 
are: 

 
1
0
1 );,1|(
t
t
ttf  and 


 
1
0
1 );,2|(
tt
t
tt
n
f . For example, the time series 
,tit uu   where ).,0(...~
2
it diiu   
For i = 1, 2, the density function is: 




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
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




  2
2
2
1
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2
1
exp
)1416.3(2
1
);,|(
i
it
i
tt
u
if . In order to model multiple regime 
shifts, we can replace the index i in the density function );,|( 1  tt if  by a discrete 
variable St, whose possible values are 1, 2, . . . , k and the density function generalises to 
);,|( 1  ttt Sf . Thus St, can be considered as a regime indicator which is serially 
dependent upon St-1, St-2, …, St-k, in which case the regime switching process is referred to 
as a k
th
 order Markov switching process. It is important to note that St, has its own 
distribution which cannot be observed, which means that we cannot construct the 
likelihood function by using );,|( 1  ttt Sf . Consequently, we must have the density 
function );|( 1  ttf  by eliminating the unobserved term St. If the past information 
1t  does not help in evaluating the distribution of St, we can use an approach here: we 
consider a conditional likelihood, )|( 1ttSP , and multiply it to the conditional density 
);,|( 1  ttt Sf : 


 
J
s
ttttttt
t
SPSff
1
111 )|();,|();|(       … … … (4.1) 
The unobserved term St can be eliminated by summing up all the possible values 
of it. The corresponding likelihood is: 
 
  
 
T
t
T
t
k
s
ttttttt
t
SPSff
1 1 1
111 )|();,|();|(  … … (4.2) 
This log-likelihood function from (4.2) can be written as: 
  
  
 
T
t
T
t
k
s
ttttttt
t
SPSffL
1 1 1
111 )|();,|(ln);|(lnln  … (4.3) 
This function is a weighted average of the density functions for multiple regimes, 
with weights being the probability of each regime.  Finally this MRS representation is 
used to estimate the model with explanatory variables with endogenous regime switching.  
For solution algorithms, Hamilton (1994) simplifies the analysis to the cases where 
the density function of t depends only on finitely many past values of St: 
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);,,...,,|();,,|( 1111   tmtttttttt SSSfSSf  … … (4.4) 
for some finite integer m, and the corresponding conditional likelihood is 
)|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP , with the assumption that St follows a first-order Markov 
chain: ststttttt pSSPSSP 1111 )|(),|(   , where the transition probability, tt ssp 1 , is 
specified as a constant coefficient that is independent of time t (time-invariant). The 
conditional likelihood )|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP  can then be calculated iteratively 
through two equations as follows: 

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  … … … … (4.5) 
for t = 2, 3. . . . , T. Note that the left-hand side term )|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP  differs 
from the second term on the right-hand side )|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP  in that all of the St 
terms are one period ahead. The term, )|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP , in which the first St–1 
term and 1t  are both subscripted by the same period of time, is then computed as 
follows: 
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… (4.6) 
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Given initial values, )|,...,,( 01  mttt SSSP , we can calculate 
)|,...,,( 11  tmttt SSSP  by using (4.5) and (4.6) iteratively, as discussed in Kim and 
Nelson (1999). Now to determine the initial values, )|,...,,( 01  mttt SSSP , we first 
note that if we further assume that  ),...,,|( 021 jjj SSSP  
,)|( 11 jj ssjj PSSP  for j = 0, 1, 2, . . ., then we have: ,...,,,( 11  SSSP . 
)|()| 0)1(0)1( )2()1(11    mssssssm SPpppS mm . 
Given the m terms of transition probabilities )2()1(11   mm ssssss ppp  , we 
have to determine k values for the )|( )1(  YsP m  term for the k possible states of s-(m-1). 
The easiest approach is to assume they are some given constants such as the same 
number k−1 for each of them. Hamilton (1994) also provides an alternative way to find 
these initial values, i.e. to consider these as fixed parameters just like the way the 
transition probabilities ststp 1  are assumed to be fixed parameters. Therefore, this 
approach starts the filter at time t =1, and the initial values are obtained from ordinary 
790 Haider, Din, and Ghani 
 
least square regression. Once the coefficients of the model are estimated using an 
iterative maximum likelihood procedure and the transition probabilities are generated, it 
can provide an easy way to use the algorithm in Kim and Nelson (1999) to derive the 
filtered probabilities for St using all the information up to time t. 
 
5.  THE RESULTS 
This section provides a discussion of the main results based on calibration of the 
theoretical model and estimation of regime switching models of inflation and economic 
growth. Calibration results are presented in Appendix B, whereas estimation results are 
reported in Appendix C.  
 
5.1.  Calibration Results of the Theoretical Model 
The deep parameter values for model calibrations are given in Table B1 of 
section B. Most of these parameter values are based on authors’ calculations except 
that the share of governance in the production function is taken from Choudhary, et 
al. (2010). The parameter value of discount factor () is set in order to obtain 
historical mean of the nominal interest rate in the steady state  which turns out to be 
0.987 for Pakistan’s case. The value of steady state growth () is 6.0, which is 
calculated by taking long-run average of real GDP of the whole sample. Share of 
governance () in production function is set to be 0.25. The share of expenditure on 
public infrastructure () is calculated by taking the ratio of total expenditure on 
public infrastructure to GDP which turns out to be 0.45. The share of public officials 
(bureaucrats) in the economy (1–) is calculated by taking the ratio of employed 
labor in public sector to total labor force and the obtained value is 0.25. The 
parameter of corruption () and governance () are calculated from indices of 
bureaucratic corruption and governance. Using these parameter values, the 
theoretical model is calibrated recursively. The process of iteration is performed up 
to forty years, where the initial period is taken as 1970. It covers the full post- 
partition episode of Pakistan’s economy.10 Model simulation results for CPI inflation 
and real GDP growth are given in Table B2 and Figures B1, B2 and B3 of Appendix 
B. These results show that simulated series of the theoretical model closely mimic 
the actual series. The subsample results across different political regimes are also 
robust. It confirms the implications of the theoretical model that when any autocratic 
regime comes into power macroeconomic fundamentals tend to improve with 
slowdown in inflation, robust growth, and lower bureaucratic corruption due to good 
governance. But in the case of democratic regimes, these results are reversed: 
governance becomes weak with increase in the level of corruption. Also, the elected 
governments tend to rely more on seigniorage to finance their expenditures with 
adverse consequences for inflation and growth. The model calibration results also 
indicate that the model is quite suitable for analysing the inflation dynamics in 
Pakistan: within sample inflation predictions outperform growth predictions which 
implies that inflation in Pakistan is more sensitive to political instability, corruption 
and poor governance.           
 
10 East, West Pakistan separation. 
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5.2.  Estimation Results of Regime Switching Models 
The estimation results
11
 of regime switching models (RSM) are reported in Table 
C1. Both econometric models of inflation and economic growth are subdivided into two 
forms: one with corruption and second with governance. This is due to computational 
simplicity as parameters associated with these variables are varying (not fixed) subject to 
regime change. It reduces computational complexity in terms of state selection and also 
provides independent smoothed probabilities at high and low frequencies across sub 
political regimes. The parameters associated with all other explanatory variables are 
treated as fixed and their estimated values can be interpreted in the usual way.  
The first term in all RSMs is intercept which is insignificant in all the cases. It 
indicates the fitness of these RSMs showing that there are minimum risks of omitted 
variable bias. The per capita output growth is negatively related with CPI. The estimates 
of agriculture output shares in inflation regressions also provide similar results. In case of 
growth models, these results are robust. The estimation results of growth model show that 
Inflation contributes negatively to output growth. It implies that to have sustained output 
growth, inflation should be curtailed at non-harmful levels.  
Trade openness estimates in the case of inflation models appear are positive and 
significant.  One possible interpretation may be the higher propensity of imports which 
may put pressure on balance of payment position through the trade account. Worsening 
of balance of payment position means depreciation of local currency and hence ends up 
with high inflation. Similarly, estimation results of growth models show trade openness 
as a positive and significant determinant of output growth, because it is associated with 
productivity improvements resulting from enhanced competitiveness. 
The results of RSM1 and RSM2 show that Inflation is positively related to 
nominal exchange rate and negatively to output growth. Again being a net importer, any 
depreciation of local currency will have an adverse impact on inflation and economic 
growth. The government borrowing ratio is positively associated with inflation and 
negatively with output growth. The higher is the government borrowing from the 
domestic financial sector the higher will be the crowding out of the private sector 
resulting in low economic activity and low level of output growth.  
The fiscal balance ratio is negatively related to inflation which basically shows 
that higher deficit is accompanied with higher inflation. As with the majority of 
developing countries, due to lower credit rating in international market, the main source 
of financing the fiscal deficit is borrowing from internal sources. Higher fiscal deficit 
affects the rate of inflation in two ways; first by directly increasing inflation and, second 
by increasing the government borrowing which in turn impacts the rate of inflation. But 
surprisingly, it has a negative association with output growth which means that higher 
fiscal deficit will bring a higher level of output growth. The fiscal balance ratio is 
statistically significant in the model but its contribution in explaining output growth is 
marginal.  
 
11MATLAB package MS-Regress [developed by Marcelo Perlin (2009)] is used to estimate 
Multivariate Markov-Regime Switching models with Maximum likelihood procedures.  This toolkit is freely 
available on internet on the following link: www.mathworks.com  [Reference: Parlin (2009). MS-Regress: A 
package for Markov-Regime Switching Models in MATLAB. Matlab central: File Exchange]. 
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The private sector credit is negatively associated with inflation, which shows that 
private sector credit stimulates output which helps in curtailing inflation. This result is in 
contrast with earlier findings. Although private sector credit is statistically significant but 
its contribution in the explanation of inflation in the model is marginal. The private sector 
credit is positively related to output growth showing that access to the financial resources 
stimulates economic activity and hence output growth.  
As Pakistan is a net oil importer, inflation is positively related to international oil 
prices. The estimation results of inflation models confirm this scenario. Due to scarce 
financial resources, any hike in international oil prices is passed on to domestic 
consumers leading to higher cost of transportation and increase in prices of consumer 
items. Similar to the estimates of the inflation model, the growth model estimates show 
that international oil prices are negatively associated with economic growth.   
Inflation is positively associated with central bank governor turnover, which 
means that frequent changes in the top leadership of the central bank could be 
inflationary. One possible interpretation of this positive relationship may be the validity 
of fiscal dominance hypothesis that potentially undermines central bank policy decisions 
on price stability. Output growth is positively related to human capital which is in line 
with the predictions of the endogenous growth models. A well-educated and skilled 
human capital can be instrumental in research and development, adoption of new 
technology and productivity improvements resulting in higher output growth.  
The regime switching estimates of corruption in the case of inflation model show 
positive linkages with inflation both in autocratic and democratic regimes. However, in 
autocratic regime, its magnitude is negligible, whereas in democratic regimes corruption 
significantly contributes towards high inflation. Similar results are found in the case of 
governance, which is negatively related to inflation in both the regimes. In autocratic 
regimes, high magnitude of governance implies a significant slowdown of inflation in 
such regimes. These dynamics can also be observed from Figure C1 and Figure C2 of 
Appendix-C, where Markov-regime switching probabilities of corruption and governance 
are plotted along with inflation. These figures show that democratic regimes are more 
vulnerable with high level of corruption and bad governance.     
The results of growth model show a negative association of corruption with 
economic growth both in autocratic and democratic regimes. Corruption significantly 
declines economic growth in democratic regimes but autocratic regimes show 
insignificant results. Governance appears is positively related to economic growth in both 
the regimes. In autocratic regimes, high magnitude of governance implies a significant 
surge in growth process. These results are robust in the case of Markov-Regime 
switching plots which are shown in Figure C3 and Figure C4 of Appendix-C, where 
smoothing probabilities of corruption and governance are plotted with real GDP growth.  
These figures show that autocratic regimes tend to show better economic performance 
with robust economic growth, low level of corruption, and good governance. 
Along with regime switching estimates, autoregressive coefficients (of order 1) of 
the inflation models show high persistence. Such high persistence means inflation takes a 
fair amount of time in changing its curvature. Once the economy enters in high 
inflationary period, sustained efforts are required to get the economy back to a low level 
of inflation. The level of corruption and poor quality of governance are the main 
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determinants of high persistence rate in inflation indicating that both corruption and poor 
governance cause continuous distortions in market mechanisms and price structures 
making inflation stubborn. However, in the case of economic growth, low level of 
persistence in output is observed indicating that output is more vulnerable to different 
types of political regimes. Sustained output growth requires corruption free 
implementation of development activities which could only be achieved with good 
governance. These findings are consistent with the implications of the theoretical models.    
 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study mainly focuses on analysing the consequences of political instability, 
governance and bureaucratic corruption on inflation and growth in the case of Pakistan. A 
representative agent model with micro-foundations and two Markov-Regime switching 
models of inflation and growth have been used. The analyses based on both these 
approaches show that high corruption along with weak governance cause high inflation 
and low growth. In an environment with weak governance, agents enhance their level of 
corruption resulting in leakages in public revenues and forcing the government to rely on 
seigniorage to finance public expenditures with adverse consequences for inflation and 
economic growth. Based on stylised facts, the paper shows that both corruption and poor 
governance typically coincide with political instability during the democratic regimes 
signifying the critical need to achieve political stability and to enhance the quality of 
governance for better economic outcomes. 
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APPENDIX-A 
 
Table A1 
 Description and Sources of Selected Variables 
S. No. Variable Description / Source 
VAR1 CPI Inflation Rate Overall domestic inflation. This series is the annual growth rates of consumer 
price index (CPI: base 2000=100) for Pakistan. Data source of this variable is 
FBS, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR2 Real GDP Growth Real Gross Domestic Product (Real GDP). This series is the annual growth 
rates of Real GDP with base 2000-01. Data source of this variable is Pakistan 
Economic Survey, MOF, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR3 Per Capital Output 
Growth 
Per capita output is calculated by taking ratio of Real GDP to total population. 
Then series is constructed by taking annual growth rates of per capita output. 
Data on total population is taken from Pakistan Economic Survey, Various 
issues, MOF, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR4 Trade Share Trade Shares are computed by taking ratio of total trade (total exports + total 
imports) to nominal GDP. This series is taken as proxy of trade openness. Data 
on total exports and total imports are taken from FBS, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR5 Agriculture Output 
Share 
Agriculture output shares are calculated by taking ratio of total agriculture 
output to real GDP. Data on agriculture output is taken from Pakistan Economic 
Survey, MOF, Islamabad, Pakistan. 
VAR6 Exchange Rate Bilateral nominal Exchange rate of Pakistan Rupees in terms of US Dollars. 
The data of this series is taken from the Statistics Department of the State Bank 
of Pakistan, Karachi, Pakistan. 
VAR7 Government 
Borrowing Ratio 
Government Borrowing ratio is computed by taking ratio of net budgetary 
borrowing to GDP. The data on net budgetary borrowing is taken from 
Statistics Department of the State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi, Pakistan. 
VAR8 Fiscal Balance Ratio Fiscal Balance Ratio is computed by taking ratio of total budget balance (total 
revenue - total expenditure) to nominal GDP. The data on fiscal balance is 
taken from Pakistan Economic Survey, various issues, MOF, Islamabad, 
Pakistan. 
VAR9 Growth in Private 
Credit 
The series is the annual growth rates of total private sector credit. Data of this 
series is taken from Statistics Department of the State Bank of Pakistan, 
Karachi, Pakistan.  
VAR10 International Oil 
Prices 
Data on international oil prices is taken from International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) of International Monetary Fund database. 
VAR11 Human Capital Data on Human capital formation is proxy by average year of schooling. Data 
source of this variable is Barro and Lee (2010).  
VAR12 Central Bank 
Governor Turnover 
This variable is proxy by a dummy variable. In this series, value 1 being 
assigned to all those years where governor turnover (State Bank of Pakistan) is 
taking place.   
VAR13 Index of Corruption Index of Corruption is taken from Barro (1991) and International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) database. This index is ranked from 0 to 10. Low index value of 
corruption shows high level of corruption. 
VAR14 Index of Governance Index of Governance is also taken from Barro (1991) and International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) database. This index is ranked from 0 to 10. Low index 
value of governance shows poor level of governance. 
Note:  MOF: Ministry of Finance; FBS: Federal Bureau of Statistics. 
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Table A2 
 Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables Included in Regime Switching Regressions 
S. 
No. Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Variance 
Std. 
Dev. Kurtosis 
No. of 
Obs. 
1. CPI Inflation Rate 7.45 6.04 27.98 –3.23 31.96 5.65 5.08 61 
2. Real GDP Growth 4.94 5.03 9.83 –1.33 5.53 2.35 –0.44 61 
3. 
Per Capital Output 
Growth 2.25 2.18 7.78 –3.70 5.30 2.30 –0.12 61 
4. Trade Share  29.45 30.14 39.30 16.56 32.25 5.68 –0.58 62 
5. Agriculture Output  0.33 0.30 0.53 0.21 0.01 0.10 –1.04 62 
6. Exchange Rate 23.50 9.99 85.55 3.31 565.19 23.77 0.11 62 
7. 
Government Borrowing 
Ratio 7.97 3.10 25.32 –2.75 75.01 8.66 –1.12 62 
8. Fiscal Balance Ratio –8.04 –8.25 –2.48 –15.80 7.41 2.72 0.02 62 
9. Growth in Private Credit 15.48 15.01 46.23 –13.82 109.33 10.46 1.01 61 
10. International Oil Prices 20.28 14.77 97.04 1.62 533.12 23.09 3.16 62 
11. Human Capital  2.18 1.83 4.90 0.85 1.59 1.26 –0.34 62 
12. 
Central Bank Governor 
Turnover 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.43 –0.55 62 
13. Index of Corruption 2.24 2.00 3.50 1.00 0.63 0.79 –1.02 62 
14. Index of Governance 3.89 3.88 6.53 1.04 4.96 2.23 –0.95 62 
 
Table A3 
 Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
  Var1 Var2 Var3 Var4 Var5 Var6 Var7 Var8 Var9 Var10 Var11 Var12 Var13 Var14 
Var1 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – – – 
Var2 –0.05 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – – 
Var3 –0.05 –0.21 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – – 
Var4 0.43 0.02 0.09 1.00 – – – – – – – – – – 
Var5 –0.42 –0.13 –0.19 –0.72 1.00 – – – – – – – – – 
Var6 0.27 –0.12 0.01 0.54 –0.76 1.00 – – – – – – – – 
Var7 –0.47 –0.04 –0.07 –0.66 0.72 –0.57 1.00 – – – – – – – 
Var8 0.09 –0.11 –0.04 0.26 –0.32 0.57 –0.53 1.00 – – – – – – 
Var9 –0.16 0.42 0.37 0.00 –0.01 –0.13 0.09 –0.13 1.00 – – – – – 
Var10 0.36 0.01 0.10 0.56 –0.71 0.82 –0.53 0.45 –0.04 1.00 – – – – 
Var11 0.32 –0.01 0.10 0.62 –0.85 0.97 –0.63 0.55 –0.05 0.87 1.00 – – – 
Var12 0.23 –0.21 –0.19 0.05 –0.18 0.20 –0.11 –0.06 –0.16 0.18 0.19 1.00 – – 
Var13 –0.48 0.11 0.08 –0.38 0.53 –0.50 –0.76 –0.62 0.17 –0.53 –0.55 –0.25 1.00 – 
Var14 –0.04 0.13 0.03 –0.29 0.42 –0.67 0.58 –0.58 0.07 –0.44 –0.61 –0.03 0.44 1.00 
Table A4 
 List of Pakistan’s Political Regimes 
Regime* Duration Type** President / Governor Prime Minister(s) 
1 Oct 19, 1951 to Aug 07, 1955 Democratic Malik Ghulam Mohammed Khawaja Nazimuddin / Mohammad Ali Bogra 
2 Aug 07, 1955 to Oct 27, 1958 Autocratic Major General Iskandar Mirza Chaudhry Mohammad Ali / Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy / I.I. 
Chundrigar / Malik Feroze khan Noon 
3 Oct 27, 1958 to Mar 25, 1969 Autocratic Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan Post Abolished 
4 Mar 25, 1969 to Dec 20, 1971 Autocratic General Agha Mohammad Yahya khan Nurul Amin 
5 Dec 20, 1971 to Aug 14, 1973 Democratic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Post Abolished 
6 Aug 14, 1973 to Sep 16, 1978 Democratic Chaudhry Fazal Illahi Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
7 Sep 16, 1978 to Aug  17, 1988 Autocratic General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq Muhammad Khan Junejo 
8 Aug 17, 1988 to Jul 18, 1993 Democratic Ghulam Ishaq Khan Benazir Bhutto /Ghulam Mustafa Khan Jatoi /Mian Mohammad Nawaz 
Sharif/Balakh Sher Mazari/Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 
9 Jul 18, 1993 to Nov 14, 1993 Democratic Wasim Sajjad Moin Qureshi 
10 Nov 14, 1993 to Dec 2, 1997 Democratic Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari Benazir Bhutto / Malik Miraj Khalid/Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 
11 Dec 2, 1997 to Jan 1, 1998 Democratic Wasim Sajjad Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 
12 Jan 1, 1998 to Jun 20, 2001 Democratic Justice (Ret.) Rafique Tarrar Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif 
13 Jun 20, 2001 to Aug 18, 2008 Autocratic General Parvez Musharraf Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali / Chuadhary Shujaat Hussain / Shaukat 
Aziz  
14 Aug 18, 2008 to Sep 9, 2008 Democratic Muhammad Mian Soomro  Muhammad Mian Soomro  / Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani 
15 Sep 9, 2008 to Dated Democratic Asif Ali Zardari Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani 
Notes: Khan and Saqib (2011). Shaded rows represent autocratic regimes. 
*Our data sample starts from 1950. Therefore, we have excluded initial two regimes,  
  [Aug 14, 1947 to Sep 11, 1948, Governor: Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah] and  
  [Sep 14, 1948 to Oct 19, 1951, Governor: Khawaja Nazimuddin]. 
**Type of political regimes is specified on the basis of the selection of presidents where autocratic type indicates military regime. 
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APPENDIX – B 
CALIBRATION RESULTS OF THEORETICAL MODEL  
 
Table B1 
 Parameter Values for Calibration 
Parameter Description Value Source 

 Discount Factor 0.987 Author’s Calculations 

 Steady State Growth Rate 6.000 Author’s Calculations 

 Share of ‘G’ in production 
function 
0.250 Choudhary et al., (2010) 

 Share of expenditure on public 
infrastructure 
0.450 Author’s Calculations 
(1–)
 Share of Public Officials in the 
economy 
0.250 Author’s Calculations 
based on Labor Survey 
Data 
 Parameter of Corruption [0,10] Recursive calculation 
based on Index of 
Corruption 

 Parameter of Governance [0,10] Recursive calculation 
based on Index of 
Governance 
 
 
Table B2 
Model Calibration Results 
Regime* 
RGDP Growth 
(Actual)  
RGDP Growth 
(Simulated) 
CPI Inflation 
(Actual) 
CPI Inflation 
(Simulated) 
4 5.35 8.61 3.80 3.76 
5 3.67 8.66 6.70 5.97 
6 4.87 5.80 16.69 9.25 
7 6.45 7.48 7.27 7.08 
8 5.12 5.63 9.30 9.36 
9 2.44 5.38 9.83 9.61 
10 4.69 4.54 11.72 11.56 
11 2.17 5.94 9.81 9.27 
12 3.48 5.37 5.39 4.88 
13 5.45 6.11 6.57 6.19 
14 3.68 6.20 12.00 8.23 
15 2.62 4.48 15.43 12.03 
Note: For list of regimes, please refer Table A4.  
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Fig. B1. 
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Fig. B2. 
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Notes:  Shaded area in these figures represent democratic regimes.  
            Horizontal axis shows annual periods (starts from 1970). 
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APPENDIX – C 
REGIME SWITCHING MODELING RESULTS 
 
Table C1 
 Estimation Results Based on Regime Switching Modeling Approach 
  RSM1 RSM2 RSM3 RSM4 
 
Dependent Variables 
Regressors with Fixed Coefficients 
CPI Inflation 
Rate 
CPI Inflation 
Rate 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Intercept 0.061 0.064 0.051 0.053 
 
(0.184) (0.196) (0.152) (0.183) 
CPI Inflation Rate – – –0.049 –0.057 
 
– – (0.047) (0.034) 
Real GDP Growth – – – – 
 
– – – – 
Per Capital Output Growth –0.124 –0.119 – – 
 
(0.031) (0.027) – – 
Trade Share  0.314 0.268 0.081 0.072 
 
(0.117) (0.023) (0.053) (0.061) 
Agriculture Output Share –0.247 –0.133 – – 
 
(0.098) (0.071) – – 
Exchange Rate 0.063 0.052 –0.012 –0.014 
 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.009) (0.011) 
Government Borrowing Ratio 0.307 0.249 –0.032 –0.028 
 
(0.075) (0.064) (0.015) (0.014) 
Fiscal Balance Ratio –0.192 –0.271 –0.097 –0.084 
 
(0.026) (0.037) (0.051) (0.044) 
Growth in Private Credit –0.087 –0.081 0.094 0.089 
 
(0.069) (0.064) (0.030) (0.026) 
International Oil Prices 0.081 0.076 –0.014 –0.017 
 
(0.029) (0.021) (0.008) (0.010) 
Human Capital  – – 0.0314 0.028 
 
– – (0.012) (0.011) 
Central Bank Governor Turnover 0.027 0.025 – – 
 
(0.016) (0.014) – – 
AR(1) 0.586 0.421 0.042 0.038 
 
(0.049) (0.043) (0.014) (0.013) 
Regressors with Regime Switching coefficients 
Avg. regime switching estimates of Corruption 
on autocratic regimes    –0.012 – 0.034 –  
 
(0.097) – (0.019) – 
Avg. regime switching estimates of Corruption 
on democratic regimes    –0.109 – 0.019 – 
 
(0.039) – (0.011) – 
Avg. regime switching estimates of governance 
on autocratic regimes    – –0.063 – 0.064 
 
– (0.016) – (0.021) 
Avg. regime switching estimates of governance 
on democratic regimes    – –0.021 – 0.020 
  – (0.041) – (0.008) 
Avg. Probability of autocratic Regime Switching 
States  
0.92 0.91 0.93 0.92 
Avg. Probability of democratic Regime 
Switching States 
0.95 0.94 0.94 0.92 
Avg. Duration of Autocratic Regimes 35 35 35 35 
Avg. Duration of Democratic Regimes 29 29 29 29 
Final Log Likelihood Ratios –169.24 –168.48 –126.76 –127.23 
Note: Standard Errors are given in parentheses. 
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Fig. C1. Markov Regime Smoothed Probabilities (Inflation Rate and  
Corruption Case) 
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Fig. C2. Markov Regime Smoothed Probabilities (Inflation Rate and  
Governance Case) 
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Fig. C3. Markov Regime Smoothed Probabilities (Output Growth and  
Corruption Case) 
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Fig.C4. Markov Regime Smoothed Probabilities (Inflation Rate and  
Governance Case) 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F
Y
5
1
F
Y
5
3
F
Y
5
5
F
Y
5
7
F
Y
5
9
F
Y
6
1
F
Y
6
3
F
Y
6
5
F
Y
6
7
F
Y
6
9
F
Y
7
1
F
Y
7
3
F
Y
7
5
F
Y
7
7
F
Y
7
9
F
Y
8
1
F
Y
8
3
F
Y
8
5
F
Y
8
7
F
Y
8
9
F
Y
9
1
F
Y
9
3
F
Y
9
5
F
Y
9
7
F
Y
9
9
F
Y
0
1
F
Y
0
3
FY
0
5
 
F
Y
0
7
F
Y
0
9
F
Y
1
1
Probabilites of Low Governance Regimes Output Growth
Markov Regime Smoothed Probabilites: Ouput Growth and Governance Case
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
F
Y
5
1
F
Y
5
3
F
Y
5
5
F
Y
5
7
F
Y
5
9
F
Y
6
1
F
Y
6
3
F
Y
6
5
F
Y
6
7
F
Y
6
9
F
Y
7
1
F
Y
7
3
F
Y
7
5
F
Y
7
7
F
Y
7
9
F
Y
8
1
F
Y
8
3
F
Y
8
5
F
Y
8
7
F
Y
8
9
F
Y
9
1
F
Y
9
3
F
Y
9
5
F
Y
9
7
F
Y
9
9
F
Y
0
1
F
Y
0
3
FY
0
5
 
F
Y
0
7
F
Y
0
9
F
Y
1
1
Probabilites of High Governance Regimes Output Growth
 
 
REFERENCES 
Acemoglu, D. (1995) Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent. European 
Economic Review 39, 17–33. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson,  J. Robinson, and Y. Thaicharoen (2003) Institutional Causes, 
Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 50, 49–123. 
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2005) Institutions as the Fundamental 
Causes of Long-run Growth. In P. Aghion and P. Durlauf (ed.) Handbook of 
Economic Growth. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 385–472.  
804 Haider, Din, and Ghani 
 
Aisen, A. and F. J.  Veiga (2006) Does Political Instability Lead to Higher Inflation? A 
Panel Data Analysis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 38, 1379–1389. 
Aisen, A. and F. J. Veiga (2008) Political Instability and Inflation Variability. Public 
Choice 135, 207–223. 
Aizenman, J. (1992) Competitive Externalities and Optimal Seigniorage. Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking 24, 71–71. 
Al-Marhubi, F. A. (2000) Corruption and Inflation. Economic Letters 66, 199–202. 
Alesina, A. (1987) Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 651–678. 
Alesina, A. (1989) Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies. Economic 
Policy 4, 57–98. 
Alesina, A. and A. Drazen (1991) Why are Stabilisation Delayed? American Economic 
Review 81, 1170–1188. 
Alesina, A.  and G. Tabellini (1990) Voting on the Budget Deficit. American Economic 
Review 80, 37–49. 
Backus, D. and J. Driffill (1985) Inflation and Reputation. American Economic Review 
75, 530–538. 
Barro, R. J. (1990) Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth. 
Journal of Political Economy 98, 103–125. 
Barro, R. J. (1991) Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 106, 407–443. 
Barro, R. J. and D. B. Gordon (1983a)  A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a 
Natural Rate Model. Journal of Political Economy 91, 589–610. 
Barro, R. J. and D. B. Gordon (1983b) Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of 
Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121. 
Barro, R. J. and J. W. Lee (2010) A New Data Set of Education Attainment in the World, 
1950–2010. (NBER Working Paper 15902).  
Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1992) Public Finance in Models of Economic Growth. 
The Review of Economic Studies 59, 645 – 661. 
Baumol, W. J. (1990). Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive. 
Journal of Political Economy, 98: 893 – 921. 
Baumol W. J. (2004) On Entrepreneurship, Growth and Rent-seeking: Henry George 
Updated. The American Economist 48, 9–16. 
Blackburn, K., Bose, N. and E. M. Haque (2006). The Incidence and Persistence of 
Corruption in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 
30, 2447–2467.  
Blackburn, K. and G. F. Forgues-Puccio (2007) Distribution and Development in a 
Model of Misgovernance. European Economic Review 51, 1534–1563.  
Blackburn, K. and J. Powell (2011). Corruption, Inflation and Growth. Economic Letters, 
113, 225–227.   
Blackburn, K. and R. Sarmah (2008)  Corruption, Development and Demography. 
Economics of Governance 9, 341–362. 
Carlstrom, C.  and T. Fuerst (2000) The Fiscal Theory of Price Level. FRBC Economic 
Review 36, 22–32. 
 Consequences of Political Instability, Governance and Bureaucratic Corruption 805 
 
Choudhary, M. A., M. N. Hanif, S. Khan, and M. Rehman (2010) Procyclical Monetary 
Policy and Governance. State Bank of Pakistan. (Working Paper No. 37).  
Cosslett, S. R. and L. F. Lee (1985) Serial Correlation in Discrete Variable Models. 
Journal of Econometrics 27, 79–97. 
Cukierman, A. S. Edwards, and G. Tabellini (1992)  Seigniorage and Political Instability. 
American Economic Review 82, 537–555. 
Davis, G. and B. Kanago (1998) High and Uncertain Inflation: Results from a New 
Dataset. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30, 218–230.    
Del Monte, A. and E. Papagni (2001) Public Expenditure, Corruption, and Economic 
Growth: The Case of Italy. European Journal of Political Economy 17, 1–16.  
Edwards, S. and G.  Tabellini (1991) Explaining Fiscal Policy and Inflation in 
Developing Countries. Journal of International Money and Finance 10, 16–48. 
Engel, C. and J. D. Hamilton (1990) Long Swings in the dollar. Are they in the Data and 
do Markets Know it? American Economic Review  80, 689–713.  
Fischer, S., R. Sahay, and C. Vegh (2002) Modern Hyper- and High Inflations. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 40, 837–880. 
Francq, C. and J. M. Zakoïan (2001) Stationarity of Multivariate Markov-Switching 
ARMA Models. Journal of Econometrics, 102: 339 – 364. 
Ghura, D. (1998) Tax Revenue in Sub-Saharan Africa: Effect of Economic Policies and 
Corruption. International Monetary Fund. (Working Paper No. 135).  
Goldfeld, S. M. and R. E.  Quandt (1973) A Markov Model for Switching Regressions. 
Journal of Econometrics 1, 3–16. 
Gupta, S., L. de Mello, and R. Sharan (2001) Corruption and Military Spending. 
European Journal of Political Economy 17, 749–777.  
Gupta S., H. Davoodi, and E. Tiongson (2000) Corruption and the Provision of Health 
Care and Education Services. (MF Working Paper, 00/116). 
Hall, R. E. and C. I. Jones (1999) Why do Some Countries Produce so Much More 
Output per Worker than Others? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 93–116. 
Hamilton, J. D. (1989) A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary 
Time Series and the Business Cycle. Econometrica 57, 357–384. 
Hamilton, J.  D.  (1994) Time Series Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hibbs, D. A.  (1977) Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. The American Political 
Science Review 71, 1467–1487. 
Huang, H. and Shang-Jin Wie (2006) Monetary Policies for Developing Countries: The 
Role of Institutional quality. Journal of International Economics 70, 239–252. 
Hussain, A. (2008) Power Dynamics, Institutional Instability and Economic Growth: The 
Case of Pakistan. The Asian Foundation. (Manuscript). 
Imam, P. A. and D. F. Jacobs (2007) Effect of Corruption on Tax Revenues in the Middle 
East. International Monetary Fund. (Working Paper No. 270).  
Iqbal, N., S. J. I. Khan, and M. Irfan (2008) Democracy, Autocracy and Macroeconomic 
Performance in Pakistan. Kashmir Economic Review 17, 61–88.  
Jones, C. I. (1995) R and D Based Models of Economic Growth. Journal of Political 
Economy 103, 759–84.  
Khan, M. S. and A. S. Senhadji (2001). Threshold Effects in the Relationship between 
Inflation and Growth. IMF Staff Papers 48, 1–21. 
806 Haider, Din, and Ghani 
 
Khan, S. U. and O. F. Saqib (2011)  Political Instability and Inflation in Pakistan. Journal 
of Asian Economics (Forthcoming Issue). 
Khawaja, M. I. and S. Khan (2009) Reforming Institutions: Where to Begin? Pakistan 
Development Review 48, 241–267.  
Kim, C. J. and C. R.  Nelson (1999) State-Space Models with Regime Switching. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott (1977) Rules Rather Than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85, 473–493. 
Mauro, P. (1995) Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 681–
710. 
McCandless, J. T. and W. E. Weber (1995) Some Monetary Facts. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 19, 2–11. 
Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1991) The Allocation of Talent: 
Implications for Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 503–530. 
Murphy, K. M., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny (1993) Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to 
Growth?  American Economic Review 83, 409–414. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975) Political Business Cycle. The Review of Economic Studies 42, 
169–190. 
North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Paldem, M. (1987)  Inflation and Political Instability in Eight Latin American Countries. 
Public Choice 52, 143–168. 
Pellegrini, L. and R. Gerlagh (2004) Corruption’s Effect on Growth and its Transmission 
Channels. Kyklos 57, 429–456. 
Phelps, E. (1973) Inflation in the Theory of Public Finance. Swedish Journal of 
Economics 75, 67–82. 
Qayyum, A., M. I. Khawaja, and A. Hyder (2008) Growth Diagnostic in Pakistan. 
European Journal of Scientific Research 24, 433–450.  
Qureshi, M. N., K. Ali, and I. R. Khan (2010) Political Instability and Economic 
Development: Pakistan Time-Series Analysis. International Research Journal of 
Finance and Economics 56, 179–192. 
Rahmani, T. and H. Yousefi (2009) Corruption, Monetary Policy and Inflation: A Cross 
Country Examination. (Unpublished Manuscript). 
Reinikka, R. and J. Svensson (2005) Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: 
Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda. Journal of European Economic 
Association 3, 259–267. 
Rogoff, K. (1985) The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary 
Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, 1169–1190. 
Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1988) Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. The 
Review of Economic Studies 55: 1 – 16. 
Romer, P. (1986) Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth. Journal of. Political 
Economy 94, 1002–1037. 
Siddiqui, D. A. and Q. M. Ahmed (2010a) Does Institutions Effect Growth in Pakistan? 
An Empirical Investigation. Department of Economics, University of Karachi. 
Pakistan. (Unpublished Memographed). 
 Consequences of Political Instability, Governance and Bureaucratic Corruption 807 
 
Siddiqui, D. A. and Q. M. Ahmed (2010b) The causal relationship between Institutions 
and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation for Pakistan Economy. 
Department of Economics, University of Karachi, Pakistan. (Unpublished 
Memographed). 
Svensson, J. (2005) Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives 
19, 19–42. 
Tanzi, V. and H. R. Davoodi (1997) Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth. 
International Monetary Fund. (Working Paper No. 139).  
Tanzi, V. and H. R. Davoodi (2000) Corruption, Growth, and Public Finances. 
International Monetary Fund. (Working Paper No. 182).  
Telartar, E., F. Telartar, T. Cavuoglu, and U. Tosun (2010) Political Instability, Political 
Freedom and Inflation. Applied Economics 42, 3839–3847.  
Tjøstheim, D. (1986) Some Doubly Stochastic Time Series Models. Journal of Time 
Series Analysis 7, 51–72. 
Vegh, C. (1989) Government Spending and Inflationary Finance: A Public Finance 
Approach. IMF Staff Papers 36: 657–677.  
Wei, S. (2000) How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors? Review of 
Economics and Statistics 82,  1–11. 
Yang, M. X. (2000) Some Properties of Vector Autoregressive Processes with Markov-
Switching Coefficients. Econometric Theory 16, 23–43. 
Zaidi, S. A. (2005) Issues in Pakistan Economy. (Second Ed.) Karachi: Oxford 
University Press.  
Zakaria, M. and B. A. Fida (2010) Democratic Institutions and Variability of Economic 
Growth in Pakistan: Some Evidence from the Time-series Analysis. Pakistan 
Development Review 48, 269–289. 
 
 
